The Philippines has a dynamic community of stakeholders working towards addressing the challenges posed by disinformation in the 2022 elections. Journalists have launched fact check initiatives. Donors continue to invest in media literacy programmes. Tech platforms like Facebook and Twitter are strengthening their content moderation practices.
These initiatives, while valuable, overlook the voices of ordinary Filipinos. How do citizens characterise the problem of ‘fake news’ during elections? Do they find disinformation a serious challenge to electoral integrity? Does disinformation offer a greater threat than the longstanding issues of vote-buying, electoral fraud, political dynasties, disenfranchisement, and violence? What can we learn from the collective wisdom of ordinary citizens?
To answer these questions, our research team conducted a three-day deliberative forum on disinformation. Twenty-six randomly selected Filipinos from all over the country came together to learn about disinformation. They represented a variety of ages, genders, regions, and socio-economic status. They deliberated on the dangers created by the spread of ‘fake news,’ answering questions of who should be held accountable for the production of disinformation and who should safeguard social media from its harms.
Participants were then asked to generate collective recommendations for stakeholders leading campaigns against disinformation.
Five key insights emerged from deliberations.
1. First, participants situated disinformation as part of the wider problem of money politics. Politicians enhance their image by using paid entities to slander their critics through disinformation tactics. As one participant put it, ‘fake news is just like vote-buying.’ While vote buying pays for votes, ‘fake news’ pays for voice. It was a familiar practice for participants, one that predates social media.
2. Second, participants recognized that disinformation thrives and cannot be disentangled from economic insecurity. Those trafficking in disinformation can include both journalists struggling to make ends meet and ordinary citizens seeking creative ways to make money.
3. Third, beyond disinformation, participants perceived unfettered media power as an issue of electoral integrity. This finding connects with broader trends of the public’s declining trust in mainstream media, especially its independence from political and economic interests. While most participants primarily sourced their information from mainstream media organizations on television and online, they expressed concern over the media’s capacity to publish or broadcast with impunity. The participants’ concerns included misleading headlines, the unfair treatment of political personalities, and the smearing of innocent people. Participants wanted to learn how to assess and call out media bias, especially during elections.
4. Fourth, many participants recognized the individual’s responsibility in the spread of disinformation. This does not mean that participants do not recognize the role of institutions in curbing disinformation. It underscores their desire to take control of their newsfeeds and make informed choices during elections.
5. Fifth, participants reached a near-consensus on the following recommendations: (1) to have an anti-fake news and anti-trolling law with safeguards that prohibit the state from weaponizing the law against political opponents and ordinary citizens; (2) to strengthen the implementation of the anti-political dynasty law to break the concentration of wealth and power to several families influencing the flow of information during elections; (3) to strengthen education campaigns with an intergenerational character and a clear focus on marginalised communities living in news deserts.
This report provides an overview of the project’s methodology and analysis of these findings. It concludes with actionable input for consideration of the wider stakeholder community.
